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Abstract 
Several studies about computational complexity of nonmonotonic reasoning (NMR) showed that 
nonmonotonic inference is significantly harder than classical, monotonic inference. This contrasts 
with the general idea that NMR can be used to make knowledge representation and reasoning 
simpler, not harder. 
In this paper we show that, to some extent, NMR fulfills the representation goal. In particular, 
we prove that nonmonotonic formalisms such as circumscription and default logic allow for a 
much more compact and natural representation of propositional knowledge than propositional 
calculus. Proofs are based on a suitable definition of a compilable inference problem, and on 
non-uniform complexity classes. Some results about intractability of circumscription and default 
logic can therefore be interpreted as the price one has to pay for having such an extra-compact 
representation. 
On the other hand, intractability of inference and compactness of representation are not equiv- 
alent notions: we exhibit intractable nonmonotonic formalisms whose nonmonotonic assumptions 
are representable by few propositional formulae. 
Finally, sometimes NMR really makes reasoning simpler. We present prototypical scenarios 
where closed-world reasoning and well-founded semantics account for a faster, complete and 
unsound approximation of classical reasoning. 
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1. Introduction 
I. I. Motivation 
The complexity of nonmonotonic reasoning (NMR) has been extensively analyzed in 
recent years. Several studies showed that nonmonotonic inference in knowledge bases is 
significantly harder than classical, monotonic inference. As an example, while deciding 
if a literal follows from a propositional Horn formula can be done in linear time provided 
we reason in the classical semantics [ I I], the same task is co-NP-complete [ 91 if we 
reason under circumscription. 
Although there are cases in which nonmonotonic inference has a complexity which 
is comparable to classical inference, the general picture shows that tractable problems 
may become intractable (e.g., the complexity raises from polynomial to NP-complete 
[ 23]), intractable problems may become “more” intractable (e.g., from NP-complete to 
Z;-complete [ 181)) decidable problems may become undecidable [ I], and undecidable 
problems may become “more” undecidable (e.g., from r.e.-complete to Hi-complete 
[ 391) . A survey on computational aspects of NMR appears as [ 101. 
This aspect of NMR is acknowledged in the AI community. Brachman [ 3, p. 10901 
writes: 
An irony of work on NMR is that, while the easy adoption and retraction of 
assumptions is most useful for speeding up natural everyday reasoning, most current 
NMR proposals drastically compound the already difficult problem of deductive 
reasoning. We urgently need to determine how NMR can be used to make common- 
sense inference faster, not slower. 
In fact, if we want to make inference more efficient, we have to give up either 
soundness or completeness. The general idea about NMR is that it can be seen as a fast 
but unsound approximation of ordinary reasoning. 
Apart from AI, NMR is sometimes used to represent knowledge in a more compact 
fashion. Noticeably, negation through cur is commonly used among PROLOG program- 
mers for writing more compact and efficient programs [ 42, Chapter 11 I. Moreover, 
closed-world reasoning [ 15,16,35,36] allows for effective representation of implicit 
knowledge in relational as well as deductive databases, and has been widely used 
among database practitioners for many years now. 
Apparently, there is a mismatch between the intuition behind NMR and the theoretical 
results on its computational complexity (and also, to some extent, the usage of NMR 
which is done in practice). The following questions naturally arise: 
l Is high complexity of NMR a bug or a feature? 
l Is the intuition that NMR simplifies reasoning wrong’? 
l Are there complexity analyses showing that NMR fits its intuitive motivation’? 
l Can we explain in some formal way why NMR seems to “save space”? 
The goal of this paper is to give an answer to the above questions. In particular we 
address two topics: 
l It is clear that NMR captures additional-w.r.t. to classical reasoning-information 
and that dealing with such information makes reasoning harder. Now suppose 
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we want to make the same inferences drawn by NMR “without using NMR”, 
i.e., suppose we have a propositional knowledge base K and we want a new knowl- 
edge base K’ such that, for all queries q, K FNMR q iff K’ k q. What would the 
monotonic knowledge base K’ look like? Clearly, K’ should contain explicitly all 
knowledge implicitly assumed by NMR. Intuitively, such knowledge captured by 
NMR is “compiled” into K’. But then, how large would K’ be? 
l It is advocated that NMR makes reasoning faster and unsound. Theoretical re- 
sults seem to contradict this. Can we show on the contrary specific examples and 
frameworks which support the above idea? 
I .2. Results 
The results we obtain belong to the following categories: 
( 1) For some NMR formalisms and some classes of formulae in which inference is 
polynomially intractable, we are able to prove that it is not possible to “compile” 
formulae into polynomially-sized data structures that allow for polynomial-time 
reasoning, regardless of the time we spend for “compilation”. Results of this 
kind are subject to some widely accepted conjectures on complexity classes. 
(2) There are NMR formalisms in which inference is polynomially intractable, but 
(3 > 
it is possible to “compile” formulae into polynomiallylsized data structures that 
allow for polynomial-time reasoning (clearly, the “compilation” is not done in 
polynomial time). 
There are common-sense reasoning problems-which can be formalized in or- 
dinary propositional logic and whose solution is polynomially intractable-that 
can be reformulated in some nonmonotonic formalism. The “translation” has the 
following properties: completeness is always retained, soundness is sometimes 
lost, and polynomial-time algorithms for NMR can be used. 
Intuitively, results of kind ( 1) above show that in some cases nonmonotonicity can be 
an extremely powerful tool for representing knowledge in a compact way. Some results 
about intractability of NMR can therefore be interpreted as the price one has to pay 
for having such an extra-compact representation. In order to prove such results, we use 
the notion of non-uniform complexity class, a topic whose importance for knowledge 
representation and reasoning has been recently highlighted in [ 241. 
On the other hand, results of kind (2) show that “non-compilability” is not al- 
ways related to intractability, since there are polynomially intractable formalisms that 
are “compilable”. Finally, results of the third kind show that, to some extent, NMR 
formalisms have accomplished the goal posed by Brachman. 
When presenting our results, we will make use of several examples, in which we 
imagine that a student must take some decisions concerning his/her curriculum. 
The structure of the paper is the following: In Section 2 we recall some definitions 
of NMR formalisms that will be considered throughout the paper, i.e., circumscription, 
default reasoning, closed-world reasoning and well-founded semantics. In Section 3 we 
recall relevant definitions about complexity classes, and we also introduce the notion of 
“compilable problem”; the main formal tool we need for the new notion are non-uniform 
complexity classes. Sections 4 and 5 are mainly devoted to presentation of results of kind 
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( I ) for the nonmonotonic formalisms of circumscription and default logic, respectively. 
In Section 6 we present results of kind (2), while results of kind (3) are presented in 
Section 7. In Section 8 we compare our research to related work, and we conclude the 
paper in Section 9. 
2. Preliminaries 
Throughout the paper we restrict our attention to propositional knowledge bases. 
We analyze circumscription, closed-world reasoning and default logic, three of the 
major NMR formalisms. Furthermore, we present a semantics for negation in logic 
programming known as well-founded semantics. Since they are widely known, in this 
paper we just mention the main definitions underlying them, restricted to a propositional 
language. 
Given a propositional formula F, we call the set of distinct propositional letters (or 
atoms) occurring in it the alphabet of F. A literal is either a letter or its negation. A 
clause is a disjunction of literals. A clause is positive if all of its literals are positive, 
negative if all of its literals are negative. A CNF formula is a conjunction of clauses. 
A CNF formula is positive if all of its clauses are positive, negative if all of its clauses 
are negative. If each clause has no more than k literals, then we have a k-CNF formula. 
If each clause has at most one positive literal, then we have a Horn formula. If each 
clause has exactly one positive literal, then we have a dejnite Horn formula. If each 
clause has at most one negative literal, then we have a dual-Horn formula. 
Interpretations and models of propositional formulae will be denoted as sets of letters 
(those which are mapped to true). If T and y are propositional formulae such that all 
models of T are models of y. i.e., y is a logical consequence of T, we write T /= y. 
Recall that, if T is a propositional formula which is either Horn, dual-Horn or 2-CNF, 
and y is a clause, then there exist well-known algorithms that decide whether T /= y 
holds in polynomial time. 
Following Lifschitz [29], given two models M and N of a propositional formula T 
and a partition (P; Z) of the alphabet of T, we write M <(p;z) N if (MnP) C (NnP). 
A mode1 M is called (P; Z)-minimal for a formula T if there is no model N of T 
such that N <(fJ:zj A4 and M ~(P;z) N. 
The circumscription C/RC(T; P; Z) of T minimizing the atoms in P and varying the 
atoms in Z denotes the set of (P; Z)-minimal models of T. Intuitively a propositional 
atom is placed in P if we are inclined to assume it false in models. In common-sense 
reasoning typically such atoms denote abnormality [30]. When an atom is in Z we 
accept that it is mapped to true in models, provided this helps in excluding some of the 
atoms in P. Through this selection of the minimal models we obtain the nonmonotonic 
behavior of circumscription. 
When Z = 8 the (P; Z)-minimal models of a formula are called just minimal. 
The closed-world assumption CWA(T) of a propositional formula T is defined in 
[36] as follows: 
CWA(T) = TU (7~ I T F p}, (1) 
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where p is a propositional letter. This rule has been refined by several authors: Minker 
[ 3 l] introduced the generalized CWA, Rajasekar, Lobo and Minker [ 351 the weak 
generalized CWA, Yahya and Henschen [47] the extended generalized CWA, Gelfond 
and Przymusinska [ 151 the careful CWA, Gelfond, Przymusinski and Przymusinska 
[ 161 the extended CWA. The notion of varying atoms has been used in the careful and 
in the extended CWA. Extended CWA, denoted as ECWA( T; P; 2) , is the most general 
of all the above rules and is defined as follows: 
Tu{dC(,dB. (T~B)A(T~KVB)} (2) 
where (P; Z) is a partition of the alphabet of T in minimized/varying atoms, K is 
any formula not involving letters from Z, and B is a disjunction of atoms from P. 
The formulae K, whose negations are added to T in the above formula, are called free 
for negation. Careful CWA, denoted as CCWA( T; P; Z), is defined as in formula (2), 
except that now K is a single atom from P. 
Relationships between circumscription and closed-world reasoning were studied by 
many researchers-see for example Reiter [ 381, Lifschitz [28], and all work defining 
closed-world rules. In particular it has been shown that an abstract notion of minimality 
underlies both of them. For example, CWA(T) is consistent iff T has a unique minimal 
model; in such a case that model is the unique model of CWA(T). In the propositional 
case, formulae ECWA( T; P; 2) and CIRC( T; P; Z) are equivalent (cf. [ 163 ) . 
Default logic has been defined by Reiter in [ 371. In default logic knowledge about 
the world is divided into two parts, representing certain knowledge and defeasible rules, 
respectively. For propositional default logic, certain knowledge (denoted with W) is a 
set of propositional formulae, while defeasible rules (denoted with D) are a collection 
of special inference rules called defaults. A default is a rule of the form 
a:/%,...,P* 
Y 
where Q),PI,...,P~,Y are propositional formulae. (Y is called the prerequisite of the 
default,/?,,...,& (n>O) are called justifications and y is the consequence. 
Default rules of the form y are called normal. A default theory is a pair (D, W), 
where D and W are as above. The semantics of a default theory (0, W) is based on the 
notion of extension, which is a possible state of the world according to the knowledge 
base. Formally, an extension is a fixpoint of the operator I’ defined as follows. r(A) is 
the smallest set such that: 
(1) W c T(A); 
(2) T(A) = {a I r(A) t= (.u}; 
(3) if 
then y E T(A). 
A set of formulae E is an extension of (D, W) iff E = l’(E). Note that an extension is 
a deductively closed set of formulae. 
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Given a set of defaults D, we denote with CONS(D) the set of consequences of the 
defaults in D, that is 
Each extension E of (D, W) is identified by a subset of D, called the set of generating 
defaults of E, defined as: 
The set GD( E, (D, W)) of generating defaults has the property (see [ 37) ) that each 
extension E of (D, W) is the deductive closure of 
WuCONS(GD(E,(D,W))). 
The set of generating defaults gives a compact representation of an extension of a default 
theory, which by definition is a deductively closed set of formulae, hence infinite. 
In this paper we are interested in two forms of inference w.r.t. a default theory. We 
say that a formula (Y is a credulous consequence of a default theory (D, W), denoted 
as (D, W) I-CR a, if there exists at least one extension E of (D, W) such that (Y E 
E. Similarly, cy is a skeptical consequence of a default theory (D, W), denoted as 
(D, W) I-SK a, if for all extensions E of (D, W) we have that Q E E. 
We finally recall the well-founded semantics for logic programs with negation. It has 
been introduced by van Gelder, Ross and Schlipf [ 441, and it associates to each program 
a unique intended model, called the well-founded model. 
Well-founded semantics is based on partial interpretations, rather than complete ones. 
Partial interpretations are sets of literals that do not contain both a literal and its negation. 
Let P be a propositional logic program with negation in the body, let L be the alphabet 
of P, and let I be a partial interpretation for P. We say A 2 L is an unfounded set of 
P with respect to I if for each atom p E A, and for each rule r of P whose head is p, 
either some subgoal q of the body is false in I or some positive subgoal of the body 
occurs in A. 
Three transformations Tp, Up and Wp of partial interpretations are defined as follows: 
p E Tp(1) if and only if there is a rule r E P such that r has head p and each 
subgoal literal in the body of r is true in I (this is the well-known immediate 
consequence operator for logic programs) ; 
Up (I), called the greatest unfounded set of P w.r.t. I, is the union of all sets that 
are unfounded w.r.t. I; 
Wp(f) = Tp(l) U~clp(f), where TU,I(I) is the set of literals obtained by negating 
each atom in Up(l). 
The well-founded model of P is defined by the following construction: Ia = 8, 
Ik+ I = Wp(lk). The operator Wp is proved to be monotone, hence there is a unique 
least fixpoint M satisfying M = Wp( M). Such M is the well-founded model of P, 
denoted as WF( P). 
As for computational complexity, van Gelder, Ross and Schlipf show in [44] that the 
well-founded model can be computed in time polynomial in the size of P. 
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3. Complexity and compilability 
We refer to the standard notation on complexity classes that can be found in [ 14,20, 
341. The size of the representation of a generic object x will be denoted as Ix]. We 
deal with the class P (decision problems whose solution can be found in polynomial 
time by a deterministic Turing machine), with the class NP (same as before, but 
the Turing machine is non-deterministic) and the class co-NP (which is the set of 
problems complementary to those in NP). Following the mainstream in complexity 
theory, we assume that P c NP and P c co-NP. Therefore, we call a problem which is 
either NP-hard or co-NP-hard polynomially intractable (we remind that a problem P is 
[ co-]NP-hard if each instance of a generic problem R in [co-]NP can be reduced to an 
instance of P by means of a polynomial-time transformation). 
Sometimes we use the symbol of a complexity class for denoting a particular Tur- 
ing machine. As an example, a P-machine is a deterministic Turing machine whose 
computing time is bounded by a polynomial p. 
Apart from such well-known complexity classes, in this paper we will be concerned 
with a specific computational notion: that of compilability of a polynomially intractable 
problem. This notion deals with how much efficiency we can gain by doing off-line 
reasoning when trying to solve a computationally difficult problem. Let’s consider an 
example: if our reasoning task is to solve a single instance of an NP-complete problem, 
and we know the instance a significant amount of time before we need the solution, 
then we could solve such a problem off-line, save the solution, and use it when it is 
necessary. A situation of this kind may arise if we have a description of a complex 
real-world system (e.g., a large instance of a propositional formula) and we want to 
know if such a description is consistent (i.e., to solve the satisfiability problem) but we 
don’t need the solution immediately. We call a problem of this kind compilable. 
This situation generalizes when there are few instances of a polynomially intractable 
problem that we would like to solve. The easy way to proceed is to solve all of 
them and cache the solutions in a table that records each pair (instance, solution). In 
principle, this strategy could be applied even when the number of instances is large, if 
there is a “compact” way of representing all pairs. Our only concern is that, for each 
instance I, we must be able to extract (on-line) the solution to I in time which is 
polynomial in the size of I. Moreover the size of the table must be polynomial in the 
size of the original problem (otherwise it would be unfeasible to store it in a physical 
system). 
We give in what follows a precise characterization of compilability of a problem. Our 
intuition tells us that a polynomially intractable problem could be said to be compilable 
if there is a data structure that grants that all interesting instances of the problem can be 
solved on-line in polynomial time in the size of the instance itself. Clearly such a data 
structure must be of polynomial size. In general, we are not interested in how much 
time it takes to build the data structure, as we are interested only in efficiency of on-line 
reasoning. 
Compilability gains relevance when the instance of a problem comes in two parts: 
a part which is@ed or off-line and a part which is varying or on-line. This can very 
well be the case for knowledge representation. Recalling the functional approach to 
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knowledge representation 1211, we may suppose we have a knowledge base defined 
by a sequence of TELL operations; queries to the knowledge base are then posed by 
ASK operations. Whenever the knowledge base reaches a reasonably stable state, we 
may want to compile in some way the information contained in it, if this speeds up the 
process of answering queries. In such a situation, our model of computation is a Turing 
machine whose input is just the varying (on-line) part. 
As an example, in the problem of checking validity of T k a, we might assume that 
the fixed part is the propositional formula T representing a knowledge base, and that the 
varying part is the propositional formula cy representing a query. 
To make explicit fixed and varying part of a problem? we propose the following 
notation: 
Notation (Problems with jixed und vqing part). We denote a problem P with a fixed 
part F and varying part V as [ P, E V 1. 
This notation is equivalent to detining a problem P as a subset of the cross-product 
F x V. where F is the set of instances of the fixed part, and V is the set of instances 
of the varying part. With abuse of notation, continuing the above example, the logical 
entailment checking problem T /= cr, where T is fixed and LY is varying, can be denoted 
as [T /= a,T,a]. 
Informally, a problem [P, F; V] is compilable if, for each instance f of the fixed part 
F there is a data structure D, of size polynomial in IfI such that Df can be used to 
solve the problem P in polynomial time. 
As an example, the problem [T + 1, T, I]. T being a CNF formula and 1 being a 
single literal is co-NP-complete, but is definitely compilable. As a matter of fact, the 
data structure we need is just a table that records, for each literal 1 occurring in T, 
whether T k 1 or not. If II is the cardinality of the alphabet of T (n E 0( IT/)) the 
size of the table is in O(n), and it can be consulted in O(n) time. Building the table 
amounts to solving O(n) instances of a co-NP-complete problem; but, as we already 
mentioned, we are not concerned with the off-line computational burden. 
The reason why IT b 1, T, I] is compilable is that the space of possible queries 
has size polynomial in ITl. A problem might be compilable even if this is not true. 
Let’s consider the problem [T k conj, T, conj], where conj is a conjunction of literals. 
The number of possible conjunctions is 62(2”). but the table mentioned before still 
suffices for a polynomial-time on-line answer, as for each set {Ii.. . . , I,,,} of literals, 
T /= 11 A A l,,, iff T /= 11,. .T k I,,,. 
We are now ready to give the exact definition of compilability of a problem. 
Definition 1 (Compilable problem). A problem [P, E V] is compilable if there exist 
two polynomials ~1, p2 and an algorithm ASK such that for each instance f of F there 
is a data structure Df such that: 
(1) /D.f/ 6 p,(l.fl); 
(2) for each instance L’ of V the call ASK(Df,c) returns yes iff (f,~,) is a “yes” 
instance of P; 
(3) ASK(Df,r!) requires time 6 p~(Icl + /Of/). 
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The definition of compilability is non-constructive, because it does not require a 
recursive way of building the data structure Df. Nevertheless, in this paper every time 
we prove that a problem is compilable we define a data structure in a constructive way. 
Note that a problem is compilable if and only if its complement is compilable, i.e., the 
class of compilable problems is closed under complementation. 
So far, we provided examples of compilable problems. The definition of non- 
compilable problem follows from Definition 1: [P, 6 V] is non-compilable if there 
are no polynomials pr , p2 with the above properties. As already mentioned, a necessary 
(but not sufficient) condition for non-compilability is that the set of possible varying 
parts of the input V is super-polynomial in the size IfI of the fixed part. Intuitively, if 
a polynomial p] with the properties mentioned in Definition 1 does not exist, it means 
that compilation would take too much (i.e., super-polynomial) space. Dually, if pr ex- 
ists and p2 does not, then encoding of the problem in a polynomial-space data structure 
is possible, but it is not possible to extract information from it in polynomial time. In 
this work we don’t prove any problem to be not compilable in this sense. The best we 
are able to do is to prove non-compilability provided some widely accepted conjectures 
on complexity classes are true. For clarifying exactly what we do, we need a digression 
into Turing machines with advice. We first report some definitions from [ 201. 
Definition 2 (Advice-taking Turing machine). An advice-taking Turing machine is a 
Turing machine that has associated with it a special “advice oracle” A, which can 
be any function, not necessarily a recursive one. On input X, a special “advice tape” is 
automatically loaded with A( 1x1) and from then on the computation proceeds as normal, 
based on the two inputs, x and A( 1x1). 
Definition 3 (Polynomial advice). An advice-taking Turing machine uses polynomial 
advice if its advice oracle A satisfies 1 A(n) 1 < p(n) for some fixed polynomial p and 
all non-negative integers n. 
Definition 4 (Non-uniform complexity classes). If C is a class of languages defined 
in terms of resource-bounded Turing machines, then Clpoly is the class of languages 
defined by Turing machines with the same resource bounds but augmented by polynomial 
advice. Any class Clpoly is also known as non-uniform C. 
Non-uniformity is due to the presence of the advice. Note that the advice is only 
a function of the size of the input, not of the input itself. Moreover we don’t have 
to care about building the advice oracle: we are free to choose it in the way we 
like, as long as the condition on the size of the advice is respected. This means, for 
example, that we can choose the oracle to provide the solution even for some undecidable 
problems. 
Throughout the paper, we will be interested in the class P/poly. Intuitively, a P/poly- 
machine has some “extra mileage” w.r.t. a P-machine since it can use the advice for 
free. An appropriate question is therefore what is exactly the “extra mileage” gained by 
the machine. As an example, it is interesting to compare P/poly to uniform complexity 
classes such as NP and co-NP. For the sake of the argument, let’s assume that co-NP C 
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P/poly. This would mean that each co-NP-complete problem such as deciding whether 
T + q, where T is a CNF formula and q is a clause, can be solved by a P/poly-machine 
M. This would imply that the problem [T k q, T, q] is compilable, as proved by the 
following argument (cf. Definition 1) : polynomial pt is the one bounding the size of the 
advice in Definition 3, while polynomial p2 is the one that characterizes the time spent 
in the computation by M. Remember that we are free to choose any advice oracle we 
like; if co-NP C P/poly, we can choose one that is an expert in propositional calculus, 
and that, for each CNF formula T of size II, provides an advice which is a data structure 
D, depending only on n and of size 6 pi (n). Such a data structure can be used by M 
along with q for proving whether T /= q holds or not in time < p2 (n + pt (n) ) (this is 
the algorithm ASK alluded to in Definition 1). 
The above argument shows that co-NP G P/poly implies [T /= q, T, q] is compilable. 
It is possible to prove the other way of the implication, i.e., that if [T + q,T, q] is 
compilable then co-NP & P/poly. This will be done at the end of the present section 
(Theorem 6). 
What we have seen shows that the concept of compilability of a problem goes hand 
in hand with the notion of non-uniform complexity classes. It is therefore important 
to know what researchers in theoretical computer science have discovered about such 
classes. Relations between non-uniform and uniform complexity classes were studied in 
the literature, cf. e.g., [21,48]. In particular, it is proved that if co-NP 2 P/poly, then 
the collapse of the so-called polynomial hierarchy happens. More formally, if co-NP C 
P/poly then Ci = H;. Collapse of the polynomial hierarchy is widely conjectured to 
be false in the literature (among other things, C; # Ht implies P f NP). We are 
therefore entitled to say that [T b q, T, q] is likely not to be compilable. 
As a matter of fact, in the present paper we go as far as proving that some problems 
concerning NMR are not compilable provided co-NP g P/poly, or, since P/poly is 
closed under complement, NP g P/poly. All our proofs make use of a general property, 
that we state in the next theorem. We assume that a decision problem 17, seen as the 
infinite set of its instances, can be partitioned according to the size of the instances, for 
a reasonable encoding (in the sense of [20]) of the instances. 
Theorem 5. Let I7 be an NP-complete problem, and let II7 = Uz, II,, where I7,, = 
{rr E ZI such that /7r( = n}. M oreover, let [ P, E V] be a problem we want to compile, 
divided into$xed part F and varying part V. Suppose that there exists a polynomial p 
such that, for each n > 0, there exists an fn E F with the following properties: 
(1) lfnl <p(n); 
(2) for all IT E II,,, there exists a L’, t V such that: 
(a) v, can be computed from r in polynomial time; 
(b) ( fn, u,) is a “yes” instance of P $f m is a “yes” instance of I7. 
With the above hypothesis, if [P, F, V] is compilable, then NP C P/poly. 
Proof. Suppose that there exists a polynomial p such that, for each n, there exists an 
f,, E F with the properties stated. Now suppose that [P, E V] is compilable. Hence, for 
each f,, there exists a data structure Df,r with properties stated in Definition 1. Moreover, 
there is a polynomial-time algorithm ASK such that ASK( Df,,, u) returns yes iff (f, u) 
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is a “yes” instance of P. Then we can define an advice-taking Turing machine in the 
following way. 
First, define the advice oracle as A(n) = Df,,. Observe that IA(n) 1 = 1 Df_,I 6 
Pl(l.fnl) G m(p(n)), where p is the polynomial mentioned in the hypotheses of 
the above theorem, and pt is the polynomial mentioned in Definition 1. Hence, the size 
of the advice is bounded by a polynomial which is the composition of pt and p. 
Secondly, the machine operates as follows: given an instance r of 17, with 1~) = n, 
the machine loads A( 1~1) = A(n) = Df,,, then computes u,, from 7r in time poly- 
nomial w.r.t. (~1, then decides whether (Df,,, u,) is a “yes” instance of P by call- 
ing ASK( Df,,, 0,). If [P, F, V] is compilable, the last decision can be made in time 
bounded polynomially by pz ( I Df,, I + IO, 1) , where p2 is the other polynomial mentioned 
in Definition 1. Therefore, the advice-taking Turing machine would globally work in 
time polynomial in 1~1. Since 17 is an NP-complete problem, this would imply NP C 
P/poly. 0 
Theorem 5 provides a general schema for the non-compilability proofs we present in 
the paper. All our non-compilability proofs use the same technique, even though with 
major differences. Most of the times, we choose as the NP-complete problem n the 
problem 3SAT [ 14, Problem LO2], and partition the set of instances as ZZ = UgI fl,,, 
according to their size n. For each n, we know that the number of distinct propositional 
letters occurring in each instance of II, is at most n, since there cannot be more than n 
literals in an instance of 3SAT of size n. Without loss of generality, we assume that all 
formulae of n,, are built on the same set of atoms L = {at,. . . , a,}. Observe that for 
each n, fl,, has the following properties: 
( 1) Each instance rr E II,, is a subset of a maximum instance v,,,~(~) E n. rmax(,,) 
is defined as the set of all the three-literal clauses on L. Clearly, all instances of 
3SAT of size n are subsets of 7r,,,ax(n). 
(2) rmax(,,) has size polynomial in n; in particular, it has size @(n3). Observe that 
~max(n) #n,. 
In our proofs we use the following conventions. We denote with a, b and c propo- 
sitional atoms, with w, x and y literals (i.e., either atoms or negated atoms), with E a 
new set of literals, one-to-one with L, defined as 
L={+zEL}. (3) 
We exploit the fact that each three-literal clause over L can be given a name: we 
denote with C a set of atoms one-to-one with possible three-literal clauses of L 
C = {ci I yi is a three-literal clause of L}. (4) 
Sometimes we use the variant NOT-ALL-EQUAL-3SAT [ 14, Problem LO31 of %AT: 
given a set of 3-CNF clauses, where each clause contains only positive literals, does 
there exist an assignment to the atoms such that in each clause at least one atom is 
mapped to true and at least one is mapped to false? In these cases, we denote with G 
a set of atoms one-to-one with possible three-atoms clauses (i.e., positive clauses) of L 
G = {gi I yi is a three-atoms clause of L}. (5) 
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We conclude the section showing a result that we anticipated before. In this way we 
demonstrate how the previously defined formal machinery works. 
Theorem 6. If the problem [ T k y, T, y] , where T is a propositional formula in CNF 
and q is a clause, is compilable, then NP C P/poly. 
Proof. By Theorem 5 we only need to choose an appropriate NP-complete problem 
n = Uz, IZ,,. a CNF f ormula T,, of size polynomial in n and show that for all rr E I7, 
there exists a clause +, computable from 7r in polynomial time such that T, /= qr iff 
7r is a “yes ” instance of 17. We choose the NP-complete problem 3SAT as our fl’. 
Let L be the alphabet of II atoms used in the 3-CNF formulae of size n, i.e., in fl,,. 
We define L’ as the new alphabet L U C, where C is a set of atoms one-to-one with 
possible three-literal clauses of L, as defined in formula (4). 
We define r, on the alphabet L’ as follows: for each clause y1 E ITT~~~(,,), T  contains 
the clause c, V y,, where c, E C. 
Note that the size of T,, is O(n’ ). and T,, is a 4-CNF formula. This completes the 
definition of z,. 
Let 7r be a generic 3-CNF formula over L. and let cl,. . , ~1, be all the atoms of C 
corresponding to the clauses in n-. Define yv = cl V V cj,. Note that q,, is computed 
in time polynomial in IT/. 
We now show that T,, F qa iff rr is satisfiable. 
(+) Assume that r is satisfiable and let M C L be a model of n-. An interpretation 
I of C is built as follows: for each c E C. if c corresponds to a clause in YT, then c is 
mapped to false, otherwise it is mapped to true. Interpretation M U I is a model of T,, 
but is not a model of qn. 
(+) Assume T,, k qr, then there is a model M of T, which maps all atoms of q,, 
into false. As a consequence, M k y, for each clause y, in r, i.e., the restriction of M 
to atoms of L is a model of 7r. 0 
The technique used in the above proof has been proposed by Kautz and Selman in 
the context of Horn least upper bounds [24] (cf. Section 8). 
4. NMR for compact representation of knowledge I: circumscription 
In the previous section we introduced the notion of compilability of a reasoning 
problem. In this section, and in the following one, we use such a notion to prove some 
computational properties of NMR. In particular, we show that NMR formalisms can 
be used to represent information in a compact way, where compactness is measured 
w.r.t. the classical representation of the same knowledge. 
We introduce an example dealing with a student who needs to plan his/her curriculum. 
First of all, we show that the natural way the student can do this is to reason using 
circumscription. Given that the reasoning problem the student is faced with is compu- 
tationally intractable, we address the following question: if the student was to reason in 
a classical fashion, how much implicit information would he/she need to represent ex- 
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plicitly in the new knowledge base? In other words, is it feasible to compile the original 
knowledge base-dealt with NMR-into a new one-dealt with a classical inference 
engine-such that the same inferences are possible in polynomial time? The results we 
prove show that, in general, this is not feasible. 
Example 7 (The lazy student). The faculties impose constraints on the possible cur- 
ricula: the set of admissible curricula is represented by means of the models of a 
propositional formula T which might look like the following: 
DataBases V Algebra, 
AlgebraVNonMonotonicReasoning, 
DataBasesVReasoningAboutKnowledge, 
AlgebraVReasoningAboutKnowledge, 
AlgebraVComputationalComplexity. 
Throughout this section we assume that such formulae are always in 2-CNF. A curricu- 
lum is just a model of T, e.g., {DataBases, Algebra, NonMonotonicReasoning}. Such 
a definition does not capture the preferences that a student might have. As an example, 
the student might be better off by doing both courses {ReasoningAboutKnowledge, 
ComputationalComplexity} than doing just one of the courses {DataBases, 
Algebra, NonMonotonicReasoning}. Moreover, the student may prefer to take as few 
courses as possible. 
This suggests to use the idea of (P; Z) -minimal models, where all exams that the 
student dislikes are in P; let’s say that 
ReasoningAboutKnowledge, 
NonMonotonicReasoning 
ComputationalComplexity 
A minimal curriculum is a (P; Z)-minimal model of T. In the above situation there are 
three minimal curricula: 
Ml {Algebra,ReasoningAboutKnowledge}, 
M2 {Algebra,ReasoningAboutKnowledge,ComputationalComplexity}, 
M3 {DataBases,NonMonotonicReasoning,ReasoningAboutKnowledge, 
ComputationalComplexity}. 
We say that a course c is mandatory if it has to be done in all curricula, i.e., T + c. A 
course c is preferred if it has to be done in all minimal curricula, i.e., CIRC(T; P; Z) b 
c. Clearly, a mandatory course is always preferred, but not vice versa. 
In the above situation there are no mandatory courses, although ReasoningAbout- 
Knowledge is preferred. 
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The above example suggests that there are at least four possible computational services 
that a student might ask: 
Problem 1. Find a curriculum. The student has no specific preferences, a curriculum is 
just as good as any other one. 
Problem 2. Find a minimal curriculum. This is an improvement w.r.t. the previous ser- 
vice, as the student can express some preferences. Nevertheless, there is no explanation 
why a curriculum is provided. In Example 1, A42 is as good as Ml. Even if Ml is 
provided as an answer, the student does not know whether ReasoningAboutKnowledge 
is preferred or not. 
Problem 3. Decide whether a course is mandatory. The student-with no preferences- 
wants to know whether he/she must attend a specific course. The shortcoming of this 
service is in that it does not give any information on non-mandatory courses that are false 
only in curricula that the student would never accept because of his/her preferences. 
Problem 4. Decide whether a course is preferred (preferences decided in advance). 
Same as above, but the student has preferences. 
This sophisticated form of reasoning is mostly relevant in this situation: the lazy 
student might take course c, but he/she does not want to commit until he/she is 
completely convinced that c is preferred. In fact not all courses suggested by an answer 
to Problem 2 are preferred. 
The complexity of the above problems has been already studied in the literature. 
When T is 2-CNF we have the following figures: 
l Problem 1 is polynomial [ 13 1. 
l Problem 2 is polynomial [4]. 
l Problem 3 is polynomial [ 131. 
l Problem 4 is co-NP-complete [ 91. 
In the above scenario NMR seems to do exactly the form of reasoning the student 
needs. In fact a solution to Problem 4 gives some extra information that solutions to the 
other three problems miss, therefore we may be willing to accept its extra complexity. 
Furthermore, this extra complexity can be dealt with by compilation, as outlined in the 
beginning of Section 3: since the set of courses the student could ever take is limited- 
let’s say they are cl, . , c,,-he/she might compute off-line which of them is preferred, 
i.e., decide whether CIRC(T; P; Z) /= c, holds for each i ( 1 < i < n). Even if this 
amounts to solve n instances of a co-NP-complete problem, the queries can be posed 
off-line and their answers cached. Then on-line query answering just amounts to table 
look-up, which is clearly polynomial. 
The next step is now to consider the scenario where several students are interested in 
preparing their curricula. Clearly this is not an additional difficulty if all of them have 
the same preferences. What happens if each student has his/her own preferences? The 
complexity of answering a single query to Problem 4 is still co-NP-complete, but there 
is an exponential number of possible queries, as the possible choices for P are 2”. Is it 
still possible to do off-line reasoning for making on-line reasoning efficiently? 
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We can think of automatically solving Problem 4, if several lazy students want to 
decide whether a course is preferred. In this case, students may or may not have the 
same preferences. 
Problem 4.1. Decide whether a course is preferred, when all students have the same 
preferences. 
Problem 4.2. Decide whether a course is preferred, when each student has his/her own 
preferences. 
Using the terminology and notations introduced in Section 3, Problem 4.1 amounts 
to the problem [ CIRC(T; P; Z) k 1, (T, P, Z), I], while Problem 4.2 corresponds to 
[ CZRC(T; P; Z) j= 1, T, (P, Z, Z) ] (note that P, Z moved from the fixed to the varying 
part in the second problem). 
The compilation argument for Problem 4 proves the following property of Problem 
4.1. 
Proposition 8. The problem [ CIRC(T; P; Z) k 1, (T, P, Z), 11, where T is 2-CNF and 
1 is a single literal, is compilable. 
Compilation for Problem 4.1 can be done simply by caching. Even if such caching 
cannot be done for Problem 4.2 (there are exponentially many different preferences) 
one may wonder if the problem is compilable in some smarter way. 
However, we are able to show that it is very unlikely that such a compilation may 
exist. For this first “non-compilability” result in the context of NMR we provide a full 
proof in the text. Proofs of the other theorems appear in the Appendix. 
Theorem 9. If the problem [ CIRC( T; P; Z) ,k I, T, (P, Z, I> 1, where T is a positive 
2-CNF and 1 is a single literal, is compilable, then NP C P/poly. 
Proof. We apply Theorem 5, so we need to choose an appropriate NP-complete problem 
17 = Uz, l7, and fo r each IZ we define a positive 2-CNF formula T, of size polynomial 
in n. Thus we show that for all T E 17, there exists a partition (P,; ZV) of the 
alphabet of T,, and a literal I,, all computable from rr in polynomial time, such that 
CIRC(T,,; P,,; Z,) k I, iff T is a “yes” instance of II. 
We choose the NP-complete problem 3SAT as our n. If a is an atom, a is its negation 
and if x is the literal 2, then i is a. Our proof is based on a reduction given in [9, 
Theorem 161, which showed that circumscriptive inference of literals in positive 2-CNF 
formulae is co-NP-hard. 
Let L be the alphabet of n atoms used in the 3-CNF formulae of size n, i.e., in fl,,. 
We define L’ as the new alphabet L U z U C U {z }, where atoms of t are as in formula 
(3), C is a set of atoms one-to-one with possible three-literal clauses of L, as defined 
in formula (4) and z is a new atom. Observe that now E denotes both a negated atom 
of L and an atom of L’. Since formulae over L’ will never use negated atoms, we can 
retain this ambiguity to simplify the notation in the reduction. 
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We define T, on the alphabet L’ according to the following rules: 
( 1) For each letter a of L, there is a clause a Vi? in T,. 
(2) For each clause y; = bvV.w Vv in rr,,,a,(,,), where w,x and .v are literals, there are 
four clauses in T,. The first three are c, V cv, c, V X. c; V v; observe that if x is a 
negated literal in r, then x is an atom in T,,. As an example, let y; = s V it V u, 
T,, contains c, V s, c, V 7, c, V II. The fourth clause is ci V z. 
Note that the size of T, is 0( rri ), and T,, is a positive 2-CNF formula. This completes 
the definition of T,. 
Let 7~ be a generic 3-CNF formula over L, and let ct.. , cl, be all the atoms of L' 
corresponding to the clauses in r. Define P, = {cl,. , c,,} U L U z, Z, = L' - P, and 
1, = z. Note that P,, Z,, and 1, are computed in time polynomial in 1~1 and 1, is the 
same for all instances 5-. 
We now show that CIRC(T,; P,; Z,) k 1, iff 7~ is satisfiable. 
(+=) Assume that 7r is satisfiable and let M C L be a model for 7r and M be a subset 
of z such that si E m iff a E M. Define MM as (L - M) U a U C. It can be verified 
that MM is a model of T,,, because it includes C, and for every atom u E L it contains 
either a or 5, but not both. Moreover, I, is false in MM. 
To prove that MM is (P,; Z,)-minimal for 7’,,. we consider separately atoms in LUE, 
and atoms in {cl,. . c,,}. No atom .Y from L U z can be eliminated from MA4 without 
introducing the corresponding atom X. since in T,! there is the clause xVX. Now consider 
the elimination of (say) c;, and let wVxVy be the ith clause of 7~. Since M is a model of 
r, M satisfies at least one literal, say, w. By construction of MM, w 6 MM because if w 
is positive, then M: E M, and therefore w @’ (L-M) ; if w is negative, then w # v. Since 
in T,, there is the clause c; V w, the atom ci cannot be eliminated without introducing w. 
Therefore, MM is minimal. Since I, @’ MM, it follows that CIRC(T,,; Pr; Z,) /& 1,. 
(3) Assume CIRC(T,; P,,; Z,) k 1, and let MM be a (P,; Z,,)-minimal model of 
T,, such that 1, is false in MM. Since for each c E C, the clause cVl, is in T,, C C MM. 
Consider an atom c; E P,, and let y; = s V 7t ?/ II. There are in T,, the three clauses ci V s, 
c, v 7, c, v 11. 
We prove that at least one of s, 7. II is not in MM. By contradiction: if s, 7, N were in 
MM, then c; could be eliminated from MM (introducing 1, to satisfy the fourth clause 
CiVlT), obtaining a model MM' with fewer atoms of P,, and MM would not be minimal, 
contradicting the hypothesis. 
Now we prove that a E MM iff a &’ MM. First, because in T,, there is the clause a V a, 
at least one of a and is is in MM. If both were in MM, either a or 5 could be eliminated, 
and the resulting model MM - {u} would still satisfy T,,. 
Define M={uE L 1 EEMM}. M is a model of 7r because it satisfies all the clauses 
yl. In fact, at least one of s, i, u is not in MM, therefore at least one of S, I, ii is in 
MM. As a consequence, either one of s, /d is in M or I is not in M, thus M satisfies y,. 
We conclude that GT is satisfiable. 0 
So far we considered atomic queries. Non-atomic clauses are nevertheless necessary 
for posing more complex queries such as disjunction (e.g., is it necessary to take at 
least one course in a given set?) or implication (e.g., is it necessary to take course a 
provided course h is taken?). Theorem 9 implies that Problem 4.2 is not compilable also 
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Table 1 
Are 2-CNF knowledge bases under circumscription compilable? 
All queries with same preferences Different preferences 
“Short” queries 
“Long” queries 
compilable (Proposition 8) 
non-compilable (Theorem IO) 
non-compilable (Theorem 9) 
non-compilable (Theorems 9, 10) 
for non-atomic queries. Instead, since in its proof it is crucial that P and 2 are given 
as part of the input, one could think that when P and Z are fixed-like in Problem 
4.1-compilation of all non-atomic queries is still possible. The next theorem shows 
that this conjecture is very unlikely to hold. 
Theorem 10. If the problem [ CIRC(T; P; Z) b q, (T, P, Z), q], where T is 2-CNF 
and q is a clause, is compilable, then NP c P/poly. 
At a first sight, the above two theorems seem to give just a negative result: NMR 
is not compilable. But the result is in fact twofold: the theorems show that if one 
wants to represent the circumscription of a 2-CNF knowledge base K with a new 
knowledge base K’, either inference in K’ is intractable, or (if inference has to be kept 
tractable) K’ has super-polynomial size w.r.t. K, in the worst case. As a consequence, 
we know that circumscription allows one to derive a super-polynomial number of new 
consequences which are not derivable from K with classical inference: if the number of 
new consequences were polynomial, they could be simply cached. It might be possible 
that such consequences could be compacted in one formula of polynomial size; but in 
this case, Theorems 9 and 10 show that extracting consequences from such a formula 
is an intractable task, unless NP 2 P/poly. Hence the positive aspect of Theorems 9 
and 10 is that circumscription is an extremely powerful tool for representing problems 
in a compact way. 
We summarize the results in Table 1, where we divide cases between the two services, 
and between “short” and “long” queries. By “short” we mean clauses of fixed length 
(e.g., length 1 to ask for preferred exams in the lazy student example), while “long” 
means clauses of arbitrary length. 
5. NMR for compact representation of knowledge II: default logic 
In this section we show that the results presented in Section 4 are not peculiar of 
circumscription, but also apply to default logic. 
We introduce a new example dealing with a student who wants to choose his/her 
curriculum to maximize his/her chances of obtaining a fellowship. We show that the 
natural way the student can do this is by formalizing the choice of the curriculum using 
default logic. Given that the problem is computationally intractable for simple default 
theories, we address the question of whether reasoning in such theories is a compilable 
problem. We show in this section that compilation is not feasible. Again, looking at the 
positive side of this results, we conclude that also default logic allows one to save a 
super-polynomial amount of space, in the best case. 
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Example 11 (Fellowships for students). A student wants to obtain a fellowship from 
HAL-9000, Inc. to pay for his/her university fees. In order to obtain it, he/she must 
present a curriculum that complies with the school rules and the requirements imposed 
by HAL-9000. The set of constraints imposed by the school officials is represented as a 
propositional formula W which might look like the following: 
DataBasesAAlgebrah NonMonotonicReasoning, 
-AlgebraV -ComputationalComplexity, 
Algebra+ReasoningAboutKnowledge, 
ComputationalComplexity+ ReasoningAboutKnowledge. 
The above formula is Horn, and the intended meaning of its clauses is that you must 
attend NonMonotonicReasoning if you attend DataBases and Algebra, you cannot 
attend both Algebra and ComputationalComplexity (e.g., because their contents 
overlap), you must attend ReasoningAboutKnowledge if you attend Algebra, etc. In 
addition to these constraints the student must satisfy the requirements imposed by HAL- 
9000. Since HAL-9000 people are interested in a specific field of computer science 
(say, algebra and computational complexity) they prefer applications containing as 
many courses as possible on this subject. Let S = {SI, . , sk} be the courses offered 
by the university on this specific subject. We can formalize these preferences via the 
set of default rules D = { $, . . . , $}. Defaults of this kind are called prerequisite-free 
positive normal unary (PPPNU) in [43 J Intuitively, an extension of the default theory 
(D, W) is a curriculum which maximizes courses in S, while still satisfying constraints 
in W. 
In our fellowship example, we have S = {Algebra, ComputationalComplexity} 
and, therefore, 
D = : A1gebra, :ComputationalComplexity 
Algebra ComputationalComplexity ’ 
We call a course c mandutor~ (for the faculties) if taking it is implied by the 
constraints imposed, i.e., W k c. A course c is relevant (for the fellowship) if there 
exists an extension E of (0. W) such that c E E, i.e., if (0, W) k_CR c. A course c is 
necessary (for the fellowship) if for all extensions E of (D, W) we have that c E E, 
i.e., if (0, W) t SK c. In our specific case, there are no mandatory courses, Algebra, 
ComputationalComplexity and ReasoningAboutKnowledge are relevant while only 
ReasoningAboutKnowledge is necessary. 
In the above scenario there are three possible computational services that a student 
might ask: 
Problem 5. Decide whether a course is mandatory. The student has no choice but to 
take all the mandatory courses. 
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Problem 6. Decide whether a course is relevant. Taking such a course does not violate 
the constraints. Moreover it belongs to at least one curriculum that satisfies requirements 
imposed by HAL-9000. 
Problem 7. Decide whether a course is necessary. Similar to the previous problem, 
but now the course belongs to all curricula satisfying the requirements imposed by 
HAL-9000. 
The complexity of some of the above problems has been already studied in the 
literature. When W is Horn and D is PFPNU, we have the following figures: 
l Problem 5 is polynomial [ 111. 
a Problem 6 is IV-complete [ 431. 
l Problem 7 is co-NP-complete (Corollary A.4 of the present paper). 
Observe that Problems 6 and 7, although intractable, could be compiled by caching 
the answers to (D, W) !-SK ci and (D, W) I--CR ci for each course ci. We now investigate 
what happens if we allow complex queries to such a default theory. Non-atomic queries 
are necessary for posing complex queries such as disjunction (e.g., is there at least one 
necessary course in a given set?) and conjunction (e.g., are all the courses in a set 
relevant?). The next theorem shows that it is very unlikely that a generalized version of 
Problem 6, where the query is either a positive conjunction or a negative disjunction, 
can be compiled. 
Theorem 12. If the problem [(D, W) k.CR q, (0, W), q] , where W is a Horn theory, 
D is a set of PFPNU defaults, and q is either a conjunction of positive literals or a 
disjunction of negative literals, is compilable, then NP C P/poly. 
As for relevance queries, the only case where compilation is effective is when we 
restrict to disjunctive positive queries, that is, queries of the kind: “Is there at least one 
relevant course in the set S?“. 
Theorem 13. The problem [(D, W) tCR q, (D, W), q] , where W is a Horn theory, D 
is a set of PFPNU defaults, and q is a disjunction of positive literals, is compilable. 
We now turn our attention to the problem of deciding whether courses are necessary 
to obtain the fellowship. If our problem is to decide whether at least one course in a 
given set is necessary, the following result tells us that a generalized version of Problem 
7 is unlikely to be compilable. 
Theorem 14. If the problem [ (0, W) !-SK q, (D, W), q], where W is a Horn theory, 
D is a set of PFPNU defaults, and q is either a disjunction of positive literals or a 
disjunction of negative ones, is compilable, then NP & P/poly. 
However, compilation is effective in reducing the complexity of on-line inference if 
only conjunctive queries are allowed. 
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Table 2 
Compilability results for W Horn, D PFPNU: C=Compilable: NC=Not Compilable 
conjunctive 
positive 
NC 
Theorem I2 
CREDULOUS 
disjunctive 
positive negative 
C NC 
Theorem I3 Theorem I2 
conjunctive 
C 
Theorem 15 
SKEmtCAL 
disjunctive 
positive negative 
NC NC 
Theorem 14 Theorem I4 
Theorem 15. The problem [ (D, W) ts~ q, (D, W), q], where W is a Horn theoty, D 
is CI set qf PFPNU defaults, urrd y is u conjunction of literals, is compilable. 
Summing up. the theorems presented in this section show that, apart from restricted 
cases, if one wants to represent a default theory with a Horn W and a PFPNU set of 
defaults D with a propositional knowledge base K, either inference in K is intractable, or 
(if inference has to be kept tractable) K has super-polynomial size w.r.t. I(D, W)l in the 
worst case. Similarly to circumscription, default logic allows for compact representation 
of knowledge. Hence the positive aspect of Theorems 12 and 14 is that even simple 
default theories are extremely powerful for representing problems in a compact way. 
We summarize the results in Table 2. where we divide cases between the two forms 
of reasoning (credulous and skeptical) and between conjunctive and disjunctive queries. 
We conclude the section by comparing these results with those of the previous section. 
It is well known [ 121 that skeptical default logic easily simulates circumscription, using 
a default * for each atom n to be minimized. That is, CIRC(T; P; Z) j= LY iff 
(D, T) kSK a!, where D = { 5 1 N E P}. By renaming each atom a with mu in both 
the default theory and (Y, one can easily prove that circumscription can be simulated by 
a PFPNU default theory. Hence, the results of the previous section apply also to default 
logic: the problem [(D, W) kSK q, (D, W), y], where W is 2-CNF and 4 is a clause, is 
compilable for “short” queries, while it is not compilable for “long” queries (cf. first 
column of Table 1). Instead, the problem [ (0, W) /-SK 4, K (D, 4) 1 (i.e., W is a fixed 
2-CNF formula and both the set D of PFPNU defaults and the clause 4 are in the varying 
part) is not compilable, independently of the form of the query (cf. second column of 
Table 1). Note that results presented in this section refer to W Horn, hence they are 
incomparable with the ones derivable from Section 4. Moreover, credulous reasoning is 
peculiar to default logic and has no counterpart in circumscription. 
6. NMR for compact representation of knowledge III: CWR 
In Section 4 we showed that, under some conditions, circumscription allows one to 
save a super-polynomial amount of space when representing a body of knowledge. Be- 
cause of the relations between propositional circumscription and closed-world reasoning 
(cf. Section 2), this holds for extended closed-world assumptions as well. More specif- 
ically, Theorems 9 and 10 hold if we replace CIRC(T; P; Z) with ECWA(T; P; Z). 
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What can be said about the other forms of closed-world reasoning that we mentioned 
in Section 2? Not all of them are able to capture enough knowledge to save super- 
polynomial space w.r.t. a purely propositional formula. As an example both the closed- 
world assumption CWA(T) and the careful closed-world assumption CCWA(T; P; Z) 
of a propositional formula T can always be represented with a propositional formula 
of size 0( ITI), since they are equivalent to T plus a set of literals. Therefore, if we 
consider classes of formulae in which deciding logical entailment is a polynomial task, 
such as Horn, dual-Horn and 2-CNF, we have compilable NMR problems: 
Proposition 16. The problems 
[CWA(T) I= q,r,ql and CCCWA(T;P;Z) k:,(T;P;Z),ql, 
where T is either Horn, dual-Horn or 2-CNF and q is a clause, are compilable. 
In fact, we can compute off-line CWA(T) or CCWA(T) and decide on-line logical 
entailment. Note that adding negative literals to T does not increase its size by more 
than a linear factor and preserves its syntactic form (e.g., the CCWA of a Horn formula 
is still Horn). 
While this result is not surprising, it nevertheless points out that compilability is not 
directly related to complexity of inference. We show this fact by focusing on CCWA, 
since it is more similar to circumscription as it allows one to express preferences 
among atoms. Inference in such a formalism can be intractable for classes of formulae 
in which classical inference is polynomial. As an example, in [9, Corollary 61 it is 
shown that checking whether a literal follows from the CCWA of a dual-Horn formula 
is co-NP-hard. Instead, testing if a dual-Horn formula logically implies a clause is a 
polynomial-time problem [ 111. 
Therefore, our results provide a new tool for the comparison of nonmonotonic for- 
malisms, apart from semantical considerations. In particular, CCWA and ECWA exhibit 
different computational behaviors: On-line reasoning in both of them is polynomially 
intractable, but only in the latter this is “justified” by the capability of capturing large 
amounts of knowledge with a compact formula. 
7. Unsound and fast inference with NMR 
As mentioned in Section 1, it has been frequently argued that one of the expected 
features of NMR was that it could account for a form of unsound, but fast, inference. 
Results on the computational complexity of NMR seem to contradict the possibility 
of NMR being faster than classical reasoning. In this section we show that there exist 
interesting scenarios where NMR is more efficient than classical reasoning even accord- 
ing to worst-case analysis, sometimes at the cost of losing soundness. We introduce 
this aspect by means of an example. This time the student must face constraints of a 
different syntactic form on his/her curriculum. 
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Example 17 (The cautious student). The faculty members represent the requirements 
needed to attend a course with a set of dependencies R: 
NonMonotonicReasoning- Algebra, 
NonMonotonicReasoning- Logic, 
DataBases - Algebra, 
ComputerArchitectures- Algebra, 
ReasoningAboutKnowledge -+ Logic, 
ComputationalComplexity~ Logic, 
i.e., to attend NonMonotonicReasoning a student should also attend Algebra, etc. 
Throughout this example we assume that such formulae are always definite Horn. A 
set such as C = {NonMonotonicReasoning, ComputerArchitectures} can represent 
courses the student has attended. The models of C U R represent all admissible comple- 
tions of the curriculum. 
A conjunct like 
gr =AlgebraAReasoningAboutKnowledgeA 
TDataBasesA XomputationalComplexity 
represents a plan of the student: courses the student may be interested in taking (positive 
literals) or avoiding (negative literals), but he/she has not committed yet. The student 
may also have alternative plans, such as 
g2=LogicAComputationalComplexity~ 
DataBasesATReasoningAboutKnowledge, 
or 
g.l=AlgebraAComputerArchitecturesA TReasoningAboutKnowledge. 
A plan g may be satisfied by a model of CUR or it may not. The student wants to know 
if in all models at least one of his/her plans will be satisfied. This could be represented 
as a goal G=gl Vg2 Vg3. 
The scenario could be modified if the faculties add new requirements to R or if the 
student makes further commitments, thus adding atoms to C. 
Let us formalize the computational services the student may be interested in: 
Problem 8. Decide whether the set of courses in C plus the courses required by R 
satisfy the goal G. 
This service provides information on the current situation but it does not give any 
guarantee on the future. The set containing all and only the courses that the student is 
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obliged to attend in order to respect the present requirements corresponds to the minimal 
model of the definite Horn theory C U R. Since CWA( C U R) corresponds to the minimal 
model of C U R, solving Problem 8 amounts to deciding whether CWA(C U R) k G 
holds. 
Problem 9. Decide whether the goal G will be satisfied no matter which new require- 
ments are imposed (in addition to R) by the faculties and which new courses (in 
addition to C) the student decides to attend. 
This service provides information on the current and the future situation. We now 
have many distinct admissible completions of the curriculum. If we want to be sure that, 
no matter which new requirements are imposed and new courses are taken, the goal is 
satisfied, we must check that in all possible completions the goal is satisfied. Since the 
completions correspond to the models of C U R, solving Problem 9 amounts to decide 
whether C U R k G holds. 
Coming back to the example, we have that CWA(C U R) k G while C U R F G. 
Therefore, if the faculties do not change the set of requirements and the student does 
not decide to take additional courses, the goal will be satisfied. 
Let’s consider an alternative goal of the student: G’ = gi V gi V gi, where 
g{ =AlgebraAReasoningAboutKnowledgeA 
Logic A +2omputationalComplexity, 
gi=LogicAComputationalComplexityA TReasoningAboutKnowledge, 
gi = Algebra A T.ReasoningAboutKnowledge. 
Both CWA( C U R) k G’ and C U R b G’ hold. As a consequence, the student is sure 
that, whatever new requirements and courses are added, the goal G’ will always be 
satisfied. 
We consider now the complexities of the above problems. 
l Problem 8 is polynomial: First compute the minimal model M of the Horn formula 
R A C, then check whether M + G. Both steps can be accomplished in polynomial 
time [II]. 
l Problem 9 is co-NP-complete: hardness follows from the co-NP-completeness of 
tautology checking of a formula in disjunctive normal form. 
NMR is faster than classical reasoning in this specific case. Here NMR can be seen 
as a fast, complete but unsound approximation of classical reasoning, as for any pair of 
formulae .Z and y, 2 k y implies CWA( 2) k y, but not the other way around. 
This behavior of NMR is not restricted to this particular situation. We take a further 
example from the logic programming field. Let P be a propositional general logic 
program-where negation is allowed in the body of the rules-and y be a clause. 
Deciding whether y is true in all the (classical) models of P, i.e., P b y interpreting 
not (negation) as classical negation, is a co-NP-complete problem. On the other hand, 
deciding whether y is a consequence of P under the well-founded semantics [ 441, i.e., y 
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is satisfied by the well-founded model of P (written WF( P) b y), is a polynomial-time 
problem. 
Also in this case NMR accounts for an approximation of classical reasoning which 
is fast, complete. but unsound in general, as P b y implies WF(P) b y, but not the 
other way around. In fact. in 144) it is noted that well-founded semantics does not use 
the excluded middle rule (i.e., an atom is mapped either to true or to false, and not 
into both), which can be seen precisely as the source of complexity in propositional 
calculus. 
Let us consider another example clarifying the kind of approximation made by the 
well-founded semantics. 
Example 18 (The short-sighted student). Recall the previous example, and suppose the 
faculty adopts more liberal requirements about courses, letting the student make some 
choices. The new requirements are represented as a set of disjunctive rules R: 
ReasoningAboutKnowledgeiDataBasesVNonMonotonicReasoning, 
DataBases + AlgebraVLogic, 
NonMonotonicReasoning-ComputationalComplexity, 
ComputationalComplexity- Logic. 
Again, a set such as C = {ReasoningAboutKnowledge} can represent courses the 
student has attended. The models of C U R represent all admissible completions of the 
cnrriculunr. As defined in Section 4, a course c is mandatory if it has to be done in all 
curricula, i.e., C u R + c. 
Problem 10. Decide whether a course is mandatory. 
It can be shown that unsatisfiability of 3-CNF formulae can be reduced to this problem, 
hence we can conclude that the problem is co-NP-complete (cf. e.g., [ 191). 
Of course, Problem 10 can be answered “no” if one finds an admissible curriculum not 
containing the given course. Now suppose the student wants to find such a curriculum. 
Since the (intractable) problem involves some hidden combinatorics, the student uses 
the following heuristic. The student has some local preferences when a choice has to 
be made, i.e., assume that for each rule with a disjunctive head, the student has a 
(local) preference about the courses he/she must choose among: one is better than the 
other ones in the head. In the example, NonMonotonicReasoning could be preferred 
to DataBases in the first rule, and Algebra could be preferred to Logic in the second 
rule. Starting from C, the student applies each rule whose body is satisfied, adding one 
of the courses in the head of a rule. 
When a choice in a disjunction has to be made, the student adds the preferred course, 
but only if none of the other courses has already been added-this criterion of minimal 
addition corresponds to the reasonable assumption that the student does not want to add 
unnecessary courses. In the example, starting from C = {ReasoningAboutKnowledge}, 
the student finds the curriculum 
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ReasoningAboutKnowledge, NonMonotonicReasoning, 
ComputationalComplexity, Logic 
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Finally, the student decides if a given course is mandatory or not based on the presence 
of the course in the curriculum built in the above way. E.g., the student decides that 
Logic is mandatory. 
Observe that the preferences expressed by the student are just local to a rule, and 
not global (this justifies the title of the example). In fact, the student prefers Algebra 
to Logic, but decides that Logic is mandatory, even if there is a propositional model 
{ReasoningAboutKnowledge, DataBases, Algebra} where Logic is not chosen while 
Algebra is. In this respect the approximation made by the above reasoning is unsound, 
i.e., a “yes” answer cannot be trusted. 
We also want to point out that the above approximate reasoning is also nonmonotonic. 
Nonmonotonicity arises as the student commits to more courses, e.g., starting from 
CU{DataBases}, the student finds the other curriculum {ReasoningAboutKnowledge, 
DataBases, Algebra}, and now decides that Logic is no longer mandatory. 
The construction of the curriculum can be mimicked (and formalized) by well- 
founded semantics in the following way: First, R is transformed into a new set of rules 
R’, where local preferences in disjunctions are expressed by shifting all courses but the 
preferred one in the body of the rule: 
ReasoningAboutKnowledgeATDataBases - NonMonotonicReasoning, 
DataBasesAlLogic -Algebra, 
NonMonotonicReasoning- ComputationalComplexity, 
ComputationalComplexity- Logic. 
Even if C U R’ is propositionally equivalent to C U R, the syntactic form suggests now a 
logic programming approach. In fact, the process by which the student builds the model 
starting from C can be captured by well-founded semantics: the well-founded model 
WF( C U R’) is exactly 
i 
ReasoningAboutKnowledge, NonMonotonicReasoning, 
ComputationalComplexity, Logic, 
TDataBases, TAlgebra 1. 
Now we can approximate the problem of deciding whether a course c is mandatory 
in the following way: we assume that c is mandatory if c E WF( C U R’), c is not 
mandatory if x E WF( C U R’) while we do not decide when neither c nor lc belong 
to WF( C U R’). Hence, the approximation we obtain is unsound, but complete: in 
fact, if a course appears as a negative atom in the well-founded model, then it is a 
non-mandatory course for sure. 
Once formalized with well-founded semantics, we recognize that the above heuristic 
procedure is a fast and unsound approximation of classical reasoning. In fact, it will 
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find an answer in polynomial time, but may not provide us with a completely defined 
and accurate curriculum. 
What we obtain is that negative atoms in the well-founded model correspond to def- 
initely avoidable courses. while undefined atoms-if any-correspond to those courses 
whose necessity in the curriculum being built we have been unable to settle. 
8. Related work 
Our notion of compilability bears some resemblance with the notion of expression 
complexity introduced by Vardi in [4S]. and further studied in [46], to characterize 
the complexity of relational query languages. However, expression complexity captures 
the complexity of applying a query to a fixed data or knowledge base, while in our 
compilability approach we consider a compiled (not fixed) knowledge base. Therefore, 
differently from Vardi’s work, our analysis takes into account the size of both the original 
knowledge base and the compiled one. 
Some work related to issues dealt with in the present paper-e.g., NMR for saving 
representational space, trading off-line computation for on-line efficiency-appeared in 
the literature. The approach taken in such papers is now briefly compared to ours. 
Borgida and Etherington ]2] propose a system for representing hierarchical knowl- 
edge, i.e., subset relations among classes of individual objects. In the system it is possible 
to say, for example, that cats, snakes and ferrets are rodent eaters and all rodent eaters 
are carnivore. Moreover it is possible to assign individual objects to classes, e.g., Tom is 
a cat. Both kinds of knowledge are represented as logical formulae. Inference of positive 
facts is governed by the hierarchy between classes, e.g., it can be inferred that Tom is 
a carnivore. Inference of negative facts is ruled by the generalized CWA of the logical 
formula: as an example, if dogs are not cats, and the most specific fact about Tom we 
know is that he is a cat, then we infer Tom is not a dog. Clearly this nonmonotonic fea- 
ture makes reasoning unsound; nevertheless, since negative facts must not be explicitly 
stored, storage space is reduced (very roughly, an improvement by a fi factor). 
When disjunctive knowledge about individuals is to be represented, e.g., Sid is either 
a cat or a ferret, the system looks for the most specific class that can represent the 
disjunction. In the present case, the system records the fact that Sid is a rodent eater. 
Clearly this is a source of incompleteness in reasoning-as rodent eaters include snakes 
as well-and also in this case space is saved, as no further class is ever created. Summing 
up, the knowledge representation system allows for saving storage space, at the cost of 
losing both soundness and completeness. 
Selman and Kautz are the first authors to introduce the idea of compilation in the 
knowledge representation field. In [ 24,411 they propose to compile a propositional 
theory for obtaining two Horn formulae, called respectively Horn least upper bound 
and Horn greatest lower bound. The main difference with our approach is in that we 
require that the compilation process completely preserves the informational content of 
the original theory, while in their approach only approximations are obtained. In fact, the 
Horn greatest lower bound allows for complete and unsound reasoning w.r.t. the original 
formula, while the Horn least upper bound allows for sound and incomplete reasoning. 
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The impact of the preprocessing in terms of the complexity (space and time) of 
reasoning in the Horn approximations is a bit complicated. Reasoning with a Horn 
formula is a polynomial-time problem in the size of the formula itself, therefore Horn 
compilation should allow for faster on-line reasoning. Anyway the Horn least upper 
bound may have super-polynomial size w.r.t. the original formula, as they prove in 
[ 241. This proof is the first one, to the best of our knowledge, that uses non-uniform 
complexity classes to prove non-compilability. 
We want to point out that some semantical aspects of Horn approximations can be 
explained in terms of nonmonotonic reasoning, as shown in [ 51. 
Other papers discuss the possibility of reducing the complexity of query answering 
through off-line preprocessing, specifically focusing on inference in classical proposi- 
tional logic. 
Moses and Tennenholtz [32] analyze the possibility of speeding up the complexity 
of query answering through a previous off-line analysis of the knowledge base. Their 
goal can be considered as a special case of our notion of compilation: they consider a 
particular subset of all queries, which they call efficient basis, whose answers enable to 
answer all queries in polynomial time. Some query languages may not admit an efficient 
basis. Our results complement theirs, as we consider any possible preprocessing (even 
non-recursive preprocessing) with the only restriction that the new representation can 
answer queries in time polynomial in the size of the original knowledge base. For each 
entry of Tables 1 and 2 marked “non-compilable”, we proved that not only no efficient 
basis exists but also that no other compilation is possible. 
The possibility of rewriting off-line a propositional theory, was addressed by Kautz, 
Kearns and Selman in [22]. In particular, they investigate the reformulation of a Horn 
formula into the set of its characteristic models, where characteristic models are inde- 
pendent models that cannot be obtained as intersection of the others. As it turns out, the 
compactness of the representation using Horn clauses and characteristic models cannot 
be compared, as it may be the case that one is exponentially more succinct than the 
other in specific cases. Nevertheless, some forms of inference are simpler if a formula 
is represented via the set of its characteristic models. 
This idea has been expanded by Khardon and Roth in two papers [25,26] where 
they present a new framework for learning and reasoning. In particular, in [26] they 
analyze the possibility of rewriting a propositional theory in a new form that admits 
a polynomial-time inference algorithm. More precisely, they generalize the notion of 
characteristic models introduced by Kautz, Kearns and Selman, to apply to all formulae, 
not just Horn ones. When knowledge bases are represented in this format, inference 
can be performed in polynomial time. Note, however, that not all boolean functions 
have a small set of characteristic models: there exist boolean functions whose CNF 
representation has size polynomial in the number of propositional variables but whose 
set of characteristic models has exponential size. 
Selman studied planning problems structured in fixed and varying parts in [ 401, 
analyzing the impact in terms of computational complexity of such a structure. An 
instance of a planning problem is defined by an initial state, a final (i.e., desired) state, 
and a set of operators that can change the state, where a state is a value assignment to a 
set of state variables. The framework in which the three components are part of the input 
of the planning problem is called donzain-itzdependerzr planning. If the set of operators 
is fixed, then we have domain-dependenf planning. Finally, if just the initial state is 
part of the input, then we have reactive planning. Some planning problems, formulated 
in the “domain-independent version”. are polynomially intractable, while they become 
polynomial in the “domain-dependent version”. Trade-offs between space and time arise 
when reactive planning is considered. The notion of llniversul plan is introduced, which 
is a function that is able to compute “the next step to do”, given the description of 
the current state. Since the set of possible situations is exponential in general, this may 
cause a blow-up in the size of the universal plan. In fact, Selman is able to prove 
that there exist cases in which such a super-polynomial blow-up must happen, unless 
NP c: P/poly. 
Recently, Nerode et al. [ 33) investigated reasoning in deductive databases where 
predicates can be minimized with circumscription. Their explicit goal is to compile 
the database off-line, trading the space needed to store the compiled database with the 
time gained in on-line query answering. Since they use the ground representation of 
the database. which is a propositional formula, our results apply. In particular, on the 
practical side, the propositional theories we use in our proofs yield databases which can 
be used as worst-case benchmarks for compiling algorithms. 
9. Conclusions 
Recent theoretical results on the computational complexity of NMR seem to contradict 
two of the main reasons for the development of nonmonotonic formalisms, namely that 
defeasible assumptions should allow for: ( I ) faster, although unsound, inference and 
(2) more compact representation of knowledge. We have shown in this paper that, to 
some extent, NMR fulfills separately its goals. 
Regarding the second goal, we have proven that circumscription and default logic 
do indeed allow for more compact representation of knowledge. These results can 
also he extended to circumscription of general propositional formulae and to many 
formalisms for belief revision and update (as shown in [ 8, 171 and in [ 61, respectively). 
In fact, in the present work we do not prove that the space of a purely propositional 
representation of a nonmonotonic formula must be super-polynomial (this is proven 
in [ 8, 17) ). Rather we prove that either there is no such polynomially-sized formula, 
or, if it exists, it is impossible to extract information from it in polynomial time (cf. 
Definition I ). Some results about intractability of NMR can therefore be interpreted as 
the price one has to pay for having extra-compact representation of knowledge. It is 
therefore unfair to say that NMR is harder than classical reasoning. In fact the input 
of a nonmonotonic inference problem could be super-polynomially smaller than the 
input for solving with classical inference the same problem. On the other hand the 
implicit assumption in saying that NMR is harder is that the sizes of the inputs are the 
same. 
Regarding the tirst goal, we have given prototypical scenarios where NMR accounts 
for a faster and unsound approximation of classical reasoning. Therefore NMR is not 
always computationally harder, and may even be simpler than classical reasoning. 
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Appendix A. Proof of theorems 
Proofs of Section 4 
Theorem 10. If the problem [ CZRC( T; P; Z) + q, (T, P, Z) , q] , where T is 2-CNF and 
q is a clause, is compilable, then NP c P/poly. 
Proof. To apply Theorem 5, we first need to choose an appropriate NP-complete problem 
ZZ = UE, fl,,, and for each n to define a 2-CNF formula T,, of size polynomial in n and 
a partition (P,,; Z,,) of the alphabet of T,,. Then, we need to show that for all 7~ E n,, 
there exists a clause qv computable in polynomial time such that CIRC( T,,; P,,; Z,) p qr 
iff 7r is a “yes” instance of n. 
We choose the NP-complete problem %AT as our 17. Our proof is based on a 
reduction given in [ 9, Theorem 161, which showed that circumscriptive inference of 
literals in positive 2-CNF formulae is co-NP-hard. Let L be the alphabet of n atoms 
used in fl,,. Let L’ be the alphabet L U z U C U D U E U {z}, where 1 and C are 
defined in formulae (3) and (4)) respectively, and D and E are isomorphic to C, 
i.e., D = {di 1 yi is a three-literal clause of L}, and similarly for E. Negative literals of 
L’ are denoted by TX, where x E L’. 
We define T,, on the alphabet L’ according to the following rules: 
( 1) For each atom a of L, there is a clause a V E in T,,. 
(2) For each clause yi = w V x V y in v,,,~~(,~), where w, x and y are literals of L, 
there are seven clauses in T,,: CiV W, ci VX, ci Vy, c~V Z, c;Vdi, diVei, Td; V Tei. 
Observe that the last two clauses express an exclusive-or between di and ei. 
Define the sets of atoms as: P,, = L U ZU C U D U E, and Z, = {z}, i.e., all atoms of 
L’ but z are minimized. Note that T,, P,, and Z,, have size polynomial in the size n of 
L, and that T,, is a 2-CNF formula. 
Given a generic 7r E n,,, let qr be the clause 
Note that qr can be computed in time polynomial in the size of r. Apart from z, 
negative literals of q= correspond to clauses appearing in 7r, whereas positive literals 
correspond to the ones not present in r. 
To make the proof more readable, we define the sets 
G7 = {Ci 1 yi E T}, D, = {di 1 yi E T}, J% = {e; ) y; E T}. 
WC now prove the theorem by showing that 7~ is satishable iff CIRC( T,,; P,,; 5,) /= q,. 
( -A) Let M C L be a model for rr. and let M = {N E E / (I E M}. Define MM as 
(L-M)UMUCiJD,U(E-E,).IIcan beverifiedthatMMisamodelofT,,because 
it includes C. for every atom N C: L it contains either c1 or 5, and the exclusive-or’s 
between the D’s and the E’s arc satisfied. Moreover, qrr is false in MM. 
To prove that MM is (P,,; Z,,)-minimal. WC‘ consider separately atoms in LULUDUE, 
atoms in C,. and atoms in C‘ C,. 
First. no atom .r from L j z can bc climinatcd from MM without introducing the 
corresponding atom Y. since in 7’,, there is the clause _rVX. Moreover. no atom in D can 
be eliminated without introducing the corresponding atom in E. and vice versa, because 
of the exclusive-or’s, 
Secondly, consider the elimination of t say j c’, t C,, and let rvV.rVy be the ith clause 
of 7r. Since M is a model of rr. M satisfies at least one literal, say, w. By construction 
of MM. the atom M‘ $! MM. Since the clause c, V n’ is in T,,. the atom c, cannot be 
eliminated without introducing IL’. 
Finally, an atom c, t C - C, cannot be eliminated without introducing the corre- 
sponding d, E D _ D,, because there is the clause c, Vrl,, and d, # MM by construction. 
Therefore, MM is minimal. 
( e) Let MM be a (PI,; Z,, )-minimal model of c,. such that q, is false in MM. From 
the falsity of q, we know that ; $! MM, D, z MM, and (D - D,) n MM = I?. From 
this and the exclusive-or’s between atoms of D and E, we know that E - E, C MM, 
and E, n MM = fl. Moreover, since for each c, ; C. the clause c, V ,: is in T,,. C 2 MM. 
Finally, for each atom (I E L at least one of (7 and 2 is in MM, because of the clause 
N V 5. and not both because of minimality of MM. 
Consider an atom c, E C, such that y, = M‘ ‘J .Y v v. There are in T,, the three clauses 
(‘, c II’. (‘, v .t. (‘, ‘,‘ j‘. We prove. by contradiction, that at least one of no, s and .v is 
not in MM. If all of n’, x and \‘ were in MM, then c, could be eliminated from MM 
(introducing ; IO satisfy the lhurth clause (‘, ‘: : ). obtaining a model MM’ with fewer 
atoms of P,,, and MM would not bc minimal, contradicting the hypothesis. Note that 
since D, C: MM. the clause c, Vd, is still satished in MM’. 
Define M = {u E L 1 Z E MM}. Observe that N E A4 if and only if CI $2 MM, because 
CI E MM iff n &i MM. Moreover. M is a model of YT because for each clause w V x’ V J 
in n, at least one of w. .Y and \’ is not in MM. and therefore at least one of them is 
mapped to true by M. 17 
The following lemma. stating a property of’ Horn theories, is useful in the proofs 
concerning default theories. 
Lemma A.l. Let H be u Hortl theory. C (I conjunction r$ positive liter& and D 
cl disjunction qf rqative liter&. l$,her-e the .set of atoms appear@ it7 C is disjoint 
,from the .set qf atoms appearirq in D arid the utoms in D occur only positively in H. 
Furthermore, assume that H k D rmd thnt H IJ (C + D} k D. This implies that 
H k C. 
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Proof. First of all, note that {C -+ D} is a Horn clause. From H U {C + D} k D it 
follows that H k (C -+ D) -+ D. With simple rewritings, we obtain H + C V D, and, 
therefore H U {lD} U {-C} is unsatisfiable. Since H k D, H U {TD} is satisfiable. 
Observe that {-D} is a set of positive atoms. Hence the set Res( H, {-D}) of clauses 
obtained by resolving all clauses of H with all atoms in TD does not contain the empty 
clause, while the set Res(Re.s( H, {YD}), -C) contains the empty clause. By hypothesis, 
atoms of D occur only positively in H, thus resolving atoms of -D with H will not 
generate any new clause; in other words, Res( H, {TD}) = HU (70). Since atoms of D 
do not appear in -C, it follows that Res(Res( H, {TD}), -C) = Res( H, -C) U (1D}. 
Since Res(Res( H, {TD}), -C> contains the empty clause, so does Res( H, -C) U(7D). 
But {‘D} does not contain the empty clause, therefore Res( H, +Z) contains it. As a 
consequence, HA -C is unsatisfiable, i.e., H k C. 0 
Theorem 12. If the problem [(D, W) OCR q, (D, W),q], where W is a Horn theory, 
D is a set of PFPNU defaults, and q is either a conjunction of positive literals or a 
disjunction of negative literals, is compilable, then NP C P/poly. 
Proof. We apply Theorem 5. We choose an appropriate NP-complete problem I! = 
IJZ, IT,,, a set of PFPNU defaults D,, and a Horn theory W,, of size polynomial in n, 
and show that for all T E IT, there exists a query qV computable in polynomial time 
such that (Dn, W,,) I-CR qT iff 7~ is a “yes” instance of 17. 
We choose the NP-complete problem NOT-ALL-EQUAL-3SAT as our n. Our proof is 
based on a reduction given in 143, Theorem 11, which showed that credulous inference 
in default theories where W is Horn and D is PFPNU is NP-hard. 
Let L be the alphabet of n atoms used in the 3-CNF formulae of size n, i.e., in 
Il,,. Using the conventions introduced at the end of Section 3, we denote with a, b, c 
propositional atoms. Let L’ be the alphabet L U G U S U R, where G is defined as in 
formula (5) and S, R are two sets of new literals one-to-one with atoms in G. 
We define W,, and D, on the alphabet L’ according to the following rules: 
( 1) For each three-atoms clause yi = a V b V c, where a, b, c E L, there are five 
clauses in W,. The first one is -a V lb V -c V -vi, and the others are -a V gi, 
TbVgi, TcVgi, TSiVri, where Si E S, ri E R, gi E G are the atoms corresponding 
t0 yi. 
(2) W,, also contains the clause r = ( VfiEG lg) V ( VrER Tr). 
(3) For each atom 1 E L there is a default dt = + in D,. 
(4) For each atom s E S there is a default d,y = $ in D,. 
Note that the size of (D,,, W,,) is O(n3), W, is a Horn theory and D, is PFPNU. 
Remark. From the above definition of D,, it follows that an extension E of (D,, W,,) 
is complete over L U S, i.e., for any atom 1 E L U S either 1 E E or -1 E E. 
Given a generic T E ZT”, that is a 3-CNF positive formula over L, a maximal solution 
for T is a set L, of atoms mapped to true such that every superset of L, is not a 
solution for T. Clearly, if 7~ has a solution it has a maximal solution. Furthermore, we 
denote with G, the set of atoms of G corresponding to the clauses in 7~ and similarly 
for S, and R,. 
Since the theorem holds for both positive conjunctions and negative disjunctions, we 
define two distinct q,. We call CPQn the conjunctive positive query and DNQr the 
disjunctive negative query: 
CPQ, = A{.~ / s E S,} A A{<? / g F G,}. (A.11 
DNQ,=V(lrIrifR,}vV{-,p).r~G,J. (A.21 
Note that both queries can be computed in time polynomial in the size of 7~. We need 
now to prove a lemma relating CPQr with DNQr. 
Lemma A.2. Let E he utj extemh qf (D,,, W,,). Then CPQn t E if DNQlr E E. 
Proof. Observe that the clause I‘ in W,, is equivalent to the formula ((A G,) A 
(A&)) -DNQr. Let 2’= CONS(CD(E,(D,,. W,,))). 
(3) If CPQr t E, then G, c E. Moreover, also R, C E because S, C E and 
because of the clauses YS, v I’, in W,,. Since ((AC,) A (AR,)) + DNQ,, E E, also 
DNQ,, t E. 
(+=) IF DNQr E E. then by definition of generating defaults, we have W,, U 25 /= 
DNQ,. Now. observe that C W,, --- I’) U SL: { -DNQr} is satisfiable, hence ( W,, -r) U 2’ &c; 
DNQn. Since W,, U 2 is a Horn theory, G, A R, is a conjunction of positive literals, 
DNQn is a disjunction of negative literals and the other conditions of Lemma A.1 
are satisfied, we have W,, U 2’ /= G, A R,. L,et SR, = {-S, V ri / y; E T}. Obviously 
( W,, - SR, f UC F R, but W,,U z‘ k R,, thus applying again Lemma A. i for each clause 
in SR, we have W,, U Z /= S,. Therefore. W,, U Z /= G, A S,, that is CPQn E E. 0 
Proof of Theorem 12 (continued). We now prove that (D,,, Wn) t,, CPQr iff 7~ has 
a solution. 
(+=) Let L, be a maximal solution for r. We show that there exists an S, such that 
a,cs,r (S - S,) and the set E, = {a 1 W,, 1; L, U S,, U S., k a} is an extension of 
(0,). W,,). Note that S, g E, by construction of E,. Moreover, since L, is a solution 
of n. for all clauses y, = (1 V b V c t T at least one of CI, h and c is in E,. Therefore, 
g, E E, and consequently, CPQr t E,. 
S, is simply found by first applying all defaults dl, d, such that 1 t L, and s E S,. 
Now apply as many defaults d, such that .c t S - S, as possible, while keeping the 
resulting theory consistent. S, is formed by the conclusions of the applied defaults d,V. 
If none of them was applicable S, is empty. 
We now prove that E, is an extension of (D,,, W,l), i.e., we show that E, is consistent 
and that all applicable defaults of D,, have been applied. Consistency is ensured by the 
fact that L,, is a solution for n. 
By definition of E,, all applicable defaults of the form d = e, where Si E S,, 
have been applied. Moreover. by construction of S,, all applicable’defaults d,v, where 
s E S - S,, have been applied. Let us assume that there exists an 1 E L - L, such 
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that dl = + is applicable. We prove that this implies L,, U {I} is a solution for rr, thus 
contradicting the maximality of L,. For each clause yi = a V b V c E r at least one of 
a, b, c is in E, since L, is a solution. Moreover, since both -a V Tb V -X V TSi and si 
are in E, at least one of Ta, -b, lc must be in E also after + has been applied. As a 
consequence, L, U {I} is a solution for rr, thus contradicting the maximality of L,. 
(+) Let us assume that (D,, W,,) l- CR CPQ,. As a consequence, there exists an 
extension E of (D,,, W,,) such that CPQV E E. Hence, for any i such that yi = aVbVc E S- 
we have that gi E E and Si E E. Since gi appears only positively in W,,, except for r, 
from Lemma A.1 it follows that at least one atom of a, b, c is in E. Furthermore, since 
si E E, at least one atom of a, b, c is not in E. Thus, L n E is a solution for r. 
We now prove that (D,, W,,) l- CR DNQ,, iff GT has a solution. This immediately 
follows from the fact that (D,, W,,) k CR CPQV and from Lemma A.2 it follows that 
(Dn, W,,) I-CR CPQlr iff (D,,, Wn) tc~ DNQn. This completes the proof. q 
Theorem 13. The problem [(D, W) tc~ q. (D, W),q], where W is a Horn theory, D 
is a set of PFPNU defaults, and q is a disjunction of positive literals, is compilable. 
Proof. We prove this theorem by first showing a decomposability property of default 
theories with Horn W and PFPNU D. 
Lemma A.3. Let W be a Horn theory, D a PFPNU set of defaults and y = al V. . .V ak 
a positive disjunction. (D, W) ~_CR y iff there exists an ai (1 < i f k) such that 
(D, W) OCR ai. 
Proof. First of all, note that any extension E of (D, W) can be represented by the 
Horn theory T = W U {I 1 -f E GD(E, (0, W))}. S’ mce T is Horn and y is a positive 
disjunction, it is well known that T b y iff there exists an ai (1 < i Q k) such 
that T k ai. Hence, if (D, W) FCR y then there exists an ai (1 6 i < k) such that 
(D, W) k_CR at. The other direction is trivial, thus the lemma follows. 0 
Proof of Theorem 13 (continued). This problem can now be solved by constructing 
off-line a table where for every atom 1 E L we store whether (D, W) !-CR I or not. 
By Lemma A.3, deciding (D, W) FcR y can be reduced to k look-ups to the above 
mentioned table, obviously in polynomial time. 0 
Theorem 14. If the problem [(D, W) ~-SK q, (D, W), q] , where W is a Horn theory, 
D is a set of PFPNU defaults, and q is either a disjunction of positive literals or a 
disjunction of negative ones, is compilable, then NP C P/poly. 
Proof. We exploit Theorem 5 by first choosing an appropriate NP-complete problem 
ZZ = UE, II,,, a set D, of PPPNU defaults, a Horn theory W,, of size polynomial in 
II, and then by showing that for all rr E Il,, there exists a disjunction qr computable 
in polynomial time such that (D,,, W,,) ASK q7 iff rr is a “yes” instance of Z7. We first 
focus on positive disjunctions. 
We choose the NP-complete problem NOT-ALL-EQUAL-3SAT as our 11. Let L be the 
alphabet of II atoms used in the 3-CNF formulae of size II, i.e., in fl,7. z is a set of 
new atoms one-to-one with the atoms of L. as in formula (3). Let L’ be the alphabet 
L !J EU G. where G is defined as in formula (5). 
We define W,, and D,, on the alphabet L’ according to the following rules: 
( I ) For each three-atoms clause y, = (1 V 17 V L’ there are two clauses in W,7: 
(a) TN V -13 V -7~ V g,; 
(b) +v 7T;v -TVs,. 
(2) For each atom 1 E L the clause 11 V m? is in W,,. 
(3) For each atom 1 E L there are two defaults in D,,: 
(a) +!; 
Note that the size of (D,,, W,,) is O(n’). W,, is a Horn theory and D,, is PFPNU. 
L,et n- be a generic 3-CNF positive formula over L. and G, be the subset of the atoms 
of G corresponding to the clauses in 7~. Let 4T = V{g / g E G,}. It is clear that 4rr can 
be computed in time polynomial in the size of T. 
We now prove that (D,,. W,J Ijsk qrr ill’ TT is a “yes” instance of NOT-ALL-EQUAL- 
3Sb.T. 
( c=) We assume rr has solutions, and L, is one of them. We show that (Dn, W,,) YsK 
cl,,,. It is sufficient to exhibit an extension E of (D,,, W,!) such that E k q,. 
We prove that E, = {a 1 W,, i 1 L, !J {I ( I 6 15,) /= a} is such an extension. Let 
GD( E,, (D,,. W,,)) be the set of generating defaults of E,. We show that: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
GD( E,. (Dn, W,l)  ‘1, 15 maximal: from constraints -1 V 17 in W,,, no other default 
can be applied without generating a contradiction. 
w,, u L, u (7 1 I g L,} ‘. IS consistent: the only way to generate an inconsistency 
is to add to W,, both 1 and 7, for some I t L. which is not the case of E. 
W,, iJ L, IJ (7 / 1 @ L,} k yTI: if this is not the case, L, would not be a solution 
to GT. as we prove now. First of all. W,, il L, U (5 ( 1 6 L,} is a Horn theory; 
therefore it implies the positive disjunction 4n iff it implies at least one of its 
disjuncts s t C,. If WC want W,, to imply some positive literal gi, Lemma A.1 
gives us only two possibilities: 
(a) 
(b) 
Add to W,, three literals CI, 0 and c’ corresponding to the formula YZ v 4 v 
?c V g, (see point ( I a) in the construction of W,,). But this would imply 
0, h.c E {I / I E L,}. i.c., L, is not a solution of 7r. 
Add to W,, three literals 5, b, C corresponding to formula -Z v 17;~ ICV,~, 
(see point ( 1 b) in the construction of W,,). But this would imply a, b, z; E 
{I ( I@ L,}. i.e.. L, is not a solution of 7r. 
( =+ ) Let us assume that (D,, , W,,) I+SK q,. As a consequence, there exists an extension 
E of (D,,, W,,) such that E F 4,. 
Let L, be the set { 1 1 j! E GD( E. (D,,, W,)) ) }. S’ mce E is an extension, for each 
1 E L it holds that: 
( I) either 1 E E or 1 E E, since E is maximal; 
(2) not both I E E and i E E. since E is consistent. 
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Since E p qrr, and la V lb V lc V gi belongs to W, there is no clause a V b V c in v 
such that all of a, b, c E L,. 
Analogously, it’s impossible that all of a, b, c # L,, otherwise 2% b, T E L,, hence 
E k gi because of clause 12 V ~z V +f V gi of W,,. Therefore, L, is a solution of rr. 
This completes the proof for positive disjunctive queries. For negative disjunctive 
queries, just substitute every occurrence of an atom g E G with Tg in W,, and qn. 0 
Theorem 14 has the following corollary, which extends the work of Stillman in [43]. 
Corollary A.4 Given a Horn theory W, a PFPNU set of defaults D and a positive 
literal 1, deciding whether (D, W) F.c& 1 is co-NP-complete. 
Proof (Sketch). Let ?r be an instance of NOT-ALL-EQUAL-3SAT, L the atoms used in 
7~, z a set of new atoms one-to-one with atoms of L, and z an atom not in L. Define 
W and D as follows: 
( 1) For each three-atom clause a V b V c E TT there are two clauses in W: 
(a) YaVTbV-vVz; 
(b) -Giv~~v-Tvz. 
(2) For each atom 1 E L there is a clause in W: 4 V 11. 
(3) For each atom 1 E L there are two defaults in D: 
(a) -j’; 
(b) ;. 
Note that (D, W) can be constructed in time polynomial in 7r, W is a Horn theory 
and D is PFPNU. 
It follows from the proof of Theorem 14 that r is a “yes” instance of NOT-ALL- 
EQUAL-3SAT iff (0, W) lf% z. 0 
Theorem 15. The problem [(D, W) k.SK q, (0, W), q], where W is a Horn theory, D 
is a set of PFPNU defaults, and q is a conjunction of literals, is compilable. 
Proof. First of all, a trivial property of skeptical reasoning in default logic is that 
(D,W) tSK aA/ iff (D,W) k SK cy and (D, W) b_SK p. The problem can be solved 
by off-line constructing a table where we store for every atom I E L whether or not 
(D, W) b_SK 1. Deciding (D, W) FSK cl A ’ . A ck can be reduced to k look-ups of such 
a table, and this can obviously be done in polynomial time. 0 
References 
[ I ] F. Baader and B. Hollunder, Embedding defaults into tenninological knowledge representation 
formalisms, in: Proceedings Third International Conference on the Principles of Knowledge 
Representation and Reasoning, Cambridge, MA ( 1992) 306-317. 
L21 A. Borgida and D.W. Etherington, Hierarchical knowledge bases and efficient disjunctive reasoning, 
in: Proceedings First International Conference on the Principles of Knowledge Representation and 
Reasoning, Toronto, Ont. ( 1989) 33-43. 
250 
131 
IdI 
151 
I 6 I 
171 
1x1 
I’)1 
1101 
IIll 
1131 
1131 
1111 
/ 151 
I IhI 
1171 
1181 
1191 
1201 
121 I 
122 l 
I2il 
1241 
M. Cadoli and M. Schaerf. A survey 01 complexity results for non-monotonic logics, J. Logic 
Pro,qnrmnfin,q 17 C 1993) 137. I60. 
W.P. Dowling and J.H. Gallicr, Linear-time algorithms fat- testing the satistiability of propositional Horn 
formulae. .I. Lox;c, Prn~enrrtnnirrp 1 ( 1984) 267-284. 
DV. Ethetington. Relating default logic and circumscription. in: Proceedings /JCA/-87, Milan ( 1987) 
3x9-494. 
S. Even, A. Itat and A. Shamtr. On the complexny of timetable and multicommodity flow problems, 
S/AM ./. Co,r,p’. 5 ( 1976) 69 I-703 
M.R. Carey and D.S. Johnson, Corry~n~e’.~ cirrti lrrrrc~c~~trh~/irx A Guide to the Theory of NP-Cotnpleteness 
C Freeman, San Francisco. CA. I979 1 
M. Gelfond and H. Przymusinska. Negation as failure: careful closure procedure, ArGf. Inrell. 30 ( 1986) 
173~.287. 
M. Gelfond. H. Przymusinaka and ‘I’ Przymusmskt. On the relationship between circumscription and 
negation as failure. Artif: hItell. 38 ( IY89) 75-91 
G. Gogic. H. Kautz. C. Papaditnitriou and B Selman. The comparative linguistics of knowledge 
representation. in: Proceedings IJCAI-95. Montreal. Que. C 199.5) 862-869. 
G. Gottlob, Complexity results for nonmonotonic logic% .I. Logic Cornput. 2 ( 1992) 397-425. 
T Imielinski. Incomplete deductive databases. AUK Mu//r. Artif: Infell. 3 ( I99 I ) 259-294. 
D.S. Johnson, A catalog of complexity classes, in: J. van Leeuwen, ed., Handbook of’ ‘fheoreficul 
Conrpurev Sciem.r W. A (North-Holland, Amsterdam. 1990) Chapter 2. 
R.M. Karp and R.J. Lipton, Some connections between non-uniform and uniform complexity classes, 
in: Procerding.~ Twe@?/z ACM S~mposiunr on T/WOI;Y of Computing ( 1980) 302-309. 
H.A. Kautz, M.J. Keams and B. Selman. Reasoning with characteristic models, in: Proceedinp AAAI-93, 
Washington, DC ( I993 ) 34-39. 
H.A. Kautz and B. Selman. Hard problems for simple default logics, Artif. /me//. 49 ( 1991 ) 243-279. 
H.A. Kautz and B. Selman. Forming concepts for fast inference. in: ProceedinR.~ AAAI-92, San Jose, 
M. Gldol, er 01. /Arrifici~r/ Iruelli~ence 88 (1996) 215-251 
R.J. Brachman. The future of knowledge representation, in: Proceedings AAAI-90, Boston. MA ( 1990) 
1082-1092. 
M. Cadoli, On the complexity of model finding for nonmonotonic propositional logics, in: A. Marchetti 
Spaccamela. f? Mentrasti and M. Venturini Zilli, eds.. Proceedings of the Fourth Ituliun Cor@rencr on 
T/rmruticul Conrpurer Science (World Scientihc Publishing, Teaneck. NJ, 1992) I2S- 139. 
M. Cadoli, Semantical and computational aspects of Horn approximations, in: Proceedings IJCAI-93. 
Chambery ( 1993 1 39-44. 
M. Cadoli. EM. Donini. P Liheratorc and M. Schaerf, The size of a revised knowledge base, in: 
Proceedings Fourteenth ACM SIGACT SICMOD SIGART Swyxhun on Principles of Databuse Sy~errrs 
(199.5) ISI-162. 
M. Cadoli, EM. Donini and M. Scharrf, Is mtractability of non-monotonic reasoning a real drawback’?. 
in: Pmwedin~s AAAI-94, Seattle, WA ( 1994) 946-95 I; extended version: RAP09.95 DIS, University 
of Roma “La Sapienzn”. Rome ( 1995). 
M. Cadoli. EM. Donim and M Schaerl: On compact representations of propositional circumscription. in: 
P,r~c~eedirt~s T\wlfth .~wp~~viurn ou 7lrroruticcd Asprc~ts of Computer Science ( 1995) 205-2 16; extended 
version: RAP 14.9.5 DIS. University of Roma “La Sapienza”, Rome ( 1995) ; also: Theoret. Cotnpur. Sci. 
I to appear) 
M. Cadoli and M Lenzerini. The complextty ot propositional closed world reasoning and circumscription, 
1. COIIf~ILlf. $~.~1. 5.;. 48 ( 1994) X5-3 IO 
CA ( 1992) 786-793. 
I25 I R. Khardon and D. Roth, Learning to treason, tn /+o~.eedrnjis AAAI-94, Seattle, WA ( 1994) 682- 
687: extended version: TR-02-94, Aiken Computation Laboratory, Harvard University. Cambridge, MA 
( 1994). 
I26 I K. Khardon and D. Roth, Reasoning with models, in: Proceedings AAAI-94, Seattle, WA ( 1994) 1 l48- 
I 153: extended version: TR-01-94. Aiken Computation Laboratory, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 
( 1994); also: Arrif: Intell. 87 ( 1996) 187-213. 
I27 I H.J. Levesque. Foundations of a functional approach to knowledge representation, Art$ Infell. 23 ( 1984) 
155-212. 
1281 
1291 
1301 
1311 
1321 
1331 
[34l 
1351 
I361 
[371 
1381 
1391 
I401 
1411 
1421 
1431 
V. Lifschitz, Closed-world databases and circumscription, Artif Intell. 27 ( 1985) 229-235. 
V. Lifschitz, Computing circumscription, in: Proceedings IJCAI-85, Los Angeles, CA ( 1985) I2 I - 127. 
J. McCarthy, Applications of circumscription to formalizing common-sense knowledge, Artif: Intell. 28 
(1986) 89-l 16. 
J. Minker, On indefinite databases and the closed world assumption, in: Proceedings Sixth Conference 
on Automared Deduction, New York ( 1982) 292-308. 
Y. Moses and M. Tennenholtz, Off-line reasoning for on-line efficiency, Artif Intell. 83 (1996) 229-239. 
A. Nerode, R.T. Ng and VS. Subrahmanian, Computing circumscriptive databases I: theory and 
algorithms, Inform. Comput. 116 (1995) 58-80. 
C.H. Papadimitriou, Computational Complexity (Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA, 1994). 
A. Rajasekar, J. Lobo and J. Minker, Weak generalized closed world assumption, J. Autom. Reasoning 
5 (1989) 293-307. 
R. Reiter, On closed world data bases, in: H. Gallaire and J. Minker, eds., Logic and Data Bases 
(Plenum, New York, 1978) 119-140. 
R. Reiter, A logic for default reasoning, Artif Intell. 13 ( 1980) 81-132. 
R. Reiter, Circumscription implies predicate completion (sometimes), in: Proceedings AAAI-82, 
Pittsburgh, PA ( 1982) 418-420. 
J.S. Schlipf, Decidability and definability with circumscription, Ann. Pure Appl. Logic 35 ( 1987) 173- 
191. 
B. Selman, Near-optimal plans, tractability, and reactivity, in: Proceedings Fourth International 
Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasaning, Bonn ( 1994) 52 l-529. 
B. Selman and H.A. Kautz, Knowledge compilation using Horn approximations, in: Proceedings AAAI- 
91, Anaheim, CA ( I99 I ) 904-909. 
L. Sterling and E. Shapiro, The Art af Prolog (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1986). 
1. Stillman, It’s not my default: the complexity of membership problems in restricted propositional 
default logics, in: Proceedings AAAI-90, Boston, MA (1990) 571-578. 
I44 I A. van Gelder, K.A. Ross and J.S. Schlipf, The well-founded semantics for general logic programs, .I. 
ACM 38 ( 1991) 620-650. 
M. Cadoli et al./Art$cial Intelligence 88 (1996) 215-251 251 
1451 M.Y. Vardi, The complexity of relational query languages, in: Proceedings Fourteenth ACM Symposium 
an Theory of Computing ( 1982) 137-146. 
1461 M.Y. Vardi, On the complexity of bounded-variable queries, in: Proceedings Fourteenth ACM SIGACT 
SIGMOD SIGART Symposium on Principles of Database Systems ( 1995) 
I47 ] A. Yahya and L.J. Henschen, Deduction in non-Horn databases, J. Autom. Reasoning 1 ( 1985) 141-160. 
148 I C.K. Yap, Some consequences of non-uniform conditions on uniform classes, Theoret. Camput. Sci. 26 
(1983) 287-300. 
